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ABSTRACT
Deep learning is increasingly used as a basic building block of secu-
rity systems. Unfortunately, deep neural networks are hard to inter-
pret, and their decision process is opaque to the practitioner. Recent
work has started to address this problem by considering black-box
explanations for deep learning in computer security (CCS’18). The
underlying explanation methods, however, ignore the structure of
neural networks and thus omit crucial information for analyzing
the decision process. In this paper, we investigate white-box expla-
nations and systematically compare them with current black-box
approaches. In an extensive evaluation with learning-based systems
for malware detection and vulnerability discovery, we demonstrate
that white-box explanations are more concise, sparse, complete and
efficient than black-box approaches. As a consequence, we gener-
ally recommend the use of white-box explanations if access to the
employed neural network is available, which usually is the case for
stand-alone systems for malware detection, binary analysis, and
vulnerability discovery.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last years, deep learning has been increasingly recognized
as an effective tool for computer security. Different types of neural
networks have been integrated into security systems, for example,
for malware detection [19, 22, 32], binary analysis [10, 39, 47], and
vulnerability discovery [29]. Deep learning, however, suffers from
a severe drawback: Neural networks are hard to interpret and their
decisions are opaque to practitioners. Even simple tasks, such as
determining which features of an input contribute to a prediction,
are challenging to solve on neural networks. Consequently, the
fascination of deep learning has started to mix with skepticism in
the security community, as opaque systems are tedious to analyze
and difficult to protect from attacks [7, 34].
As a remedy, Guo et al. [20] have recently started to explore tech-
niques for explaining the decisions of deep learning in security. The
proposed method, LEMNA, can determine the relevance of features
contributing to a prediction by approximating the decision func-
tion of a neural network. The method achieves promising results
in different security applications, yet the approach is designed as a
black-box method that ignores the structure of the neural networks
and thereby omits vital information for generating explanations.
In practice, this is an unnecessary limitation. In all cases where
predictions and explanations are computed from within the same
system, access to the neural network is naturally available. This,
for example, is the case in all stand-alone systems for malware
detection and vulnerability discovery.
In this paper, we investigate white-box explanations for deep
learning that analyze the structure of neural networks for explain-
ing predictions and have not been studied in the context of security
so far. To compare the different explanation concepts, we imple-
ment three state-of-art white-box methods [5, 41, 44] and compare
them to three black-box approaches [20, 30, 35] in different security
applications. In particular, we build on recent research on deep
learning in security and explain the predictions of two systems
for Android malware detection [19, 32], one system for detecting
malicious PDFs [46], and one system for discovering security vul-
nerabilities [29].
For our analysis, we introduce performance measures that en-
able quantatively assessing and comparing explanations. We find
that white-box explanations significantly outperform black-box ap-
proaches under these measures and thereby provide the following
advantages in practice:
• Conciseness: The explanations generated by the white-box
methods are more concise than the black-box explanations.
That is, the identified features have 30 % more impact to the
predictions on average.
• Sparsity: The white-box explanations are more sparse than
those from black-box approaches, providing few important
features for the interpretation of a decision. On average, white-
box explanations are 19 % sparser than black-box ones.
• Completeness: The white-box methods are applicable to all
decisions of the four considered security systems. The black-
box methods suffer from restrictions and non-determinism,
and can not provide meaningful results in 29 % of the cases.
• Efficiency: The white-box methods are significantly faster than
black-box approaches and yield a performance increases of at
least one order of magnitude in each of the considered security
applications.
In addition to this quantitative analysis, we also qualitatively
examine the generated explanations. As an example of this inves-
tigation, Figure 1 shows a black-box and a white-box explanation
for the deep learning system VulDeePecker [29]. While the white-
box approach provides a fine-grained and nuanced representation
of the relevant features, the black-box method generates an un-
sharp explanation that is difficult to interpret and not sufficient to
understand how the neural network arrives at a decision.
As the final part of our analysis, we investigate the validity of
the decisions of the security systems with the help of the generated
explanations. This analysis demonstrates the utility of explainable
learning, yet it unveils a considerable number of artifacts encoded
in the neural networks. Note, as an example, that both approaches
in Figure 1 highlight punctuation characters, such as a semicolon
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1 VAR0 = FUN0 ( VAR1 [ VAR2 ] , STR0 , & VAR3 ) ;
2 VAR0 = strcpy ( ( FUN0 ( strlen ( VAR1 [ INT0 ] ) + INT0 ) )
, VAR1 [ INT0 ] ) ;
1 VAR0 = FUN0 ( VAR1 [ VAR2 ] , STR0 , & VAR3 ) ;
2 VAR0 = strcpy ( ( FUN0 ( strlen ( VAR1 [ INT0 ] ) + INT0 ) )
, VAR1 [ INT0 ] ) ;
Figure 1: Explanations for a sample from the VulDeePecker dataset
using both white-box (top) and black-box (bottom) methods.
or brackets after function calls, that are irrelevant for identify-
ing security vulnerabilities. In each of the four deep learning sys-
tems, we uncover similar features that are unrelated to security but
strongly contribute to the predictions. As a consequence, we argue
that methods for explanations need to become an integral part of
learning-based security systems—first, for understanding the de-
cisions generated by neural networks and, second, for identifying
and eliminating artifacts in the learning process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We briefly review
the technical background of explainable learning in Section 2 and
analyze state-of-the-art explanation methods suitable for security
in Section 3. The considered learning-based security systems are
presented in Section 4, before we discuss their quantitative and qual-
itative evaluation in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 EXPLAINABLE DEEP LEARNING
Neural networks have been used in artificial intelligence and ma-
chine learning for over 50 years. Concepts for explaining their
decisions, however, have just recently started to be explored with
the advance and remarkable success of deep learning in several
application domains, such as image recognition [27] and machine
translation [45]. In the following, we provide a brief overview of
this work and consider two key aspects that are crucial for inter-
preting the decision of neural networks: the network architecture
and the explanation strategy.
2.1 Network Architectures
Depending on the learning task at hand, different architectures can
be used for constructing a neural network, ranging from general-
purpose networks to highly specific architectures for image and
speech recognition. In the area of security, three of these archi-
tectures are prevalent: multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural
networks, and recurrent neural networks. We discuss the design and
applications of these architectures in the following (see Figure 2).
For a more detailed description of network architectures, we refer
the reader to the book by Rojas [36] and the introduction to deep
learning by Goodfellow et al. [18].
Multilayer Perceptrons (MLPs). Multilayer perceptrons, also
referred to as feedforward networks, are a classic and general-purpose
network architecture [37]. The network is composed of multiple
fully connected layers of neurons, where the first and last layer cor-
respond to the input and output of the network, respectively. MLPs
have been successfully applied to a variety of security problems,
such as intrusion and malware detection [19, 22]. While MLP archi-
tectures are not necessarily complex, explaining the contribution
of individual features is still difficult, as several neurons impact the
decision when passing through the layers.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). These neural net-
works share a similar architecture with MLPs, yet they differ in the
concept of convolution and pooling [28]. The neurons in convolu-
tional layers receive input only from a local neighborhood of the
previous layer. These neighborhoods overlap and create receptive
fields that provide a powerful primitive for identifying spatial struc-
ture in images and data. CNNs have thus been used for detecting
Android malware directly from raw Dalvik bytecode [32]. Due to
the convolution and pooling layers, however, it is hard to explain
the decisions of a CNN, as its output needs to be “unfolded” for
understanding the impact of different features.
RecurrentNeuralNetworks (RNNs). Recurrent networks, such
as LSTM and GRU networks [9, 21], are characterized by a recur-
rent structure, that is, some neurons are connected in a loop. This
structure enables storing and processing information across pre-
dictions and enables RNNs to operate on sequences of data [14].
As a result, RNNs have been successfully applied in security tasks
involving sequential data, such as the recognition of functions in
native program code [10, 39] or the discovery of vulnerabilities
in software [29]. Interpreting the prediction of an RNN is even
more difficult, as the relevance of an input depends on the network
architecture and the sequence of previous inputs.
2.2 Explanation Strategies
The success of deep learning in several application domains has
initiated the development of strategies for better understanding
and interpreting their decision process. As part of this research
effort, several methods have been proposed that aim at explaining
individual predictions of neural networks [e.g., 5, 20, 35, 44, 48].
We focus on this form of explainable learning that can be formally
defined as follows:
Explainable learning. Given a neural network N , an input vec-
tor x = (x1, . . . ,xd ) and a prediction fN (x) = y, one aims at finding
an explanation why the label y has been selected by the network.
This explanation is typically represented as a vector r = (r1, . . . , rd )
that describes the relevance or importance of the different dimen-
sions of x for the prediction. The computed relevance values can
be overlayed with the input and thus enable highlighting relevant
features, such as the tokens in the code snippet shown in Figure 1.
(a) MLP layer (b) CNN layer (c) RNN layer
Figure 2: Overview of commonnetwork architectures in security ap-
plications: Multilayer perceptrons (MLP), convolutional neural net-
works (CNN), and recurrent neural networks (RNN).
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While there exist several different techniques for determining the
relevance vector for a prediction, most methods can be catego-
rized into two classes—black-box and white-box—depending on the
underlying explanation strategy.
Black-box Explanations. These methods operate under a black-
box setting that assumes no knowledge about the neural network
and its parameters. Black-box methods are an effective tool if no
access to the neural network is available, for example, when a learn-
ing service is audited remotely. Technically, black-box methods rest
on an approximation of the function fN which enables them to
estimate how the dimensions of x contribute to a prediction. Al-
though black-box methods are a promising approach for explaining
deep learning systems, they can be impaired by the black-box set-
ting and omit valuable information provided through the network
architecture and parameters.
White-box Explanations. White-box approaches operate un-
der the assumption that all parameters of a neural network are
known and can be used for determining an explanation. As a re-
sult, these methods do not rely on approximations but can directly
compute explanations for the function fN on the structure of the
network. In practice, predictions and explanations are often com-
puted from within the same system, such that the neural network
is readily available for generating explanations. This is usually the
case for stand-alone systems for malware detection, binary analysis,
and vulnerability discovery. However, several white-box methods
are designed for specific network layouts and not applicable to all
considered architectures [e.g., 41, 43, 48].
The authors of LEMNA argue that black-box approaches are a
preferable alternative to white-box methods in the domain of com-
puter security. In this paper, we challenge this argumentation and
demonstrate that several state-of-the-art methods for white-box
explanations can be applied in security applications and outperform
black-box approaches.
2.3 Relation to Other Concepts
Explainable learning shares similarities with adversarial learning
and feature selection. Although methods for generating adversarial
examples or selecting features often rest on similar techniques,
they pursue different goals and hence cannot be directly applied
for explaining the decisions of neural networks. To clarify these
difference, we briefly review the objectives of both concepts.
Adversarial Learning. Given a neural network N , an input vec-
tor x = (x1, . . . ,xd ) and a prediction fN (x) = y, adversarial learn-
ing is concerned with the task of finding a minimal perturbation
δ such that fN (x + δ ) , fn (x) [7, 34]. The perturbation δ includes
the information which features need to be modified in order to
change the result of the classification which is not directly ex-
plaining why x was given the label y by N . However, the Gradient
explanation method, as described in Section 3, is closely related to
this approach as the gradient ∂ fN /∂xi quantifies the difference of
fN when changing a feature xi slightly.
Feature Selection. Feature selection aims at reducting the di-
mensionality of a learning problem by selecting a subset of discrim-
inative features [13]. While the selected features can be investigated
and often capture characteristics of the underlaying data, they are
determined independent from a particular learning model. As a
result, feature selection methods cannot be direclty applied for
explaining the decision of a neural network.
3 EXPLANATION METHODS
Over the last years, several methods have been proposed for explain-
ing the decision of neural networks. Table 1 provides an overview
of recent explanation methods. While all address the same objec-
tive, they differ in technical properties that are relevant in security
applications. For example, some methods do not provide unique so-
lutions when computing an explanation, whereas others cannot be
applied to all possible inputs. In the following, we briefly introduce
each method and discuss these properties. An in-depth analysis of
the properties is carried out in Section 5.
Note that although white-box methods dominate Table 1, to the
best of our knowledge, none of these methods have been applied
and evaluated in the context of security so far.
Gradients and Integrated Gradients. One of the first white-
box methods to compute explanations for neural networks has been
introduced by Simonyan et al. [41] and is based on simple gradi-
ents. The output of the method is given by ri = ∂y/∂xi which the
authors call a saliency map. Here ri measures how much y changes
with respect to xi . Sundararajan et al. [44] extend this approach
and propose Integrated Gradients (IG), that use a baseline x ′, for
instance a vector of zeros, and calculate the shortest path from x ′
to x , given by x − x ′. To compute the relevance of xi , the gradients
wrt. xi are cumulated along this path yielding
ri = (xi − x ′i )
∫ 1
0
∂ fN (x ′ + α(x − x ′))
∂xi
dα .
Both gradient-based methods can be applied to all relevant network
architectures and thus are considered in our comparative evaluation
of explanation methods.
Layer-wise Relevance Propagation andDeepLift. These two
methods determine the relevance of a prediction by performing a
backward pass through the neural network, starting at the output
layer and performing calculations until the input layer is reached.
The central idea of layer-wise relevance propagation (LRP) is the
use of a conservation property, that needs to hold true during the
backward pass. If r li is the relevance of unit i in layer l then∑
i
r1i =
∑
i
r2i = · · · =
∑
i
rLi
needs to be true for all L layers in the network. Bach et al. [5] fur-
ther refine this property with the specific ϵ-rule and z-rule. DeepLift
also performs a backward pass but takes a reference activation
y′ = fN (x ′) of a reference input x ′ into account. The method
forces the conservation law,∑
i
ri = y − y′ = ∆y ,
that is, the relevance assigned to the features must sum up to the
difference between the outcome of x and x ′. Both approaches sup-
port explaining the decisions of feed-forward, convolutional and
recurrent neural networks. Moreover, Ancona et al. [2] show that
IG, DeepLift and LRP’s z-rule are closely related. We thus use the
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Table 1: Overview of white-box (□) and black-box (■) explanation methods. The columns remaining list properties relevant for security
applications. Methods considered in our evaluation are marked in bold face.
Explanation Method Strategy Unique solution Support for RNNs Support for batches Complete
Gradient [41], Integrated Gradients [44] □ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
LRP [5], DeepLift [40] □ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
PatternNet/ PatternAttribution [23] □ ✓ – ✓ ✓
DeConvNet [41, 48], GuidedBackprop [43] □ ✓ – ✓ ✓
CAM [49], GradCAM [38], GradCAM++ [8] □ ✓ – ✓ ✓
RTIS [11], MASK [16] □ ✓ – – ✓
LIME [35], KernelSHAP [30] ■ – ✓ – –
LEMNA [20] ■ – ✓ – –
ϵ-rule of LRP for our experiments in order to evaluate a variety of
different approaches.
PatternNet and PatternAttribution. These white-box meth-
ods are inspired by the explanation of linear models. While Pattern-
Net determines gradients and replaces neural network weights by
so-called informative directions, PatternAttribution builds on the
LRP framework and computes explanations relative to so-called
root points whose output are 0. Both approaches are restricted to
feed-forward and convolutional networks. Recurrent neural net-
works, in turn, are not supported. Consequently, we do not consider
these explanation methods in our evaluation.
DeConvNet and GuidedBackProp. These methods aim at re-
constructing an input x given output y, that is, mapping y back
to the input space. To this end, the authors present an approach
to revert the computations of a convolutional layer followed by a
rectified linear unit (ReLu) and max-pooling, which is the essen-
tial sequence of layers in neural networks for image classification.
Similar to LRP and DeepLift, both methods perform a backwards
pass through the network. The major drawback of these methods
is the restriction to convolutional neural networks. Both methods
are thus not considered in our evaluation.
CAM, GradCAM, and GradCAM++. These three white-box
methods compute relevance scores by accessing the output of the
last convolutional layer in a CNN and performing global average
pooling. Given the activations aki of the k-th channel at unit i ,
GradCam learn weightswk such that
y ≈
∑
i
∑
k
wkaki .
That is, the classification is modeled as a linear combination of the
activations of the last layer of all channels and finally ri =
∑
k wkaki .
GradCam and GradCam++ extend this approach by including spe-
cific gradients in this calculation. All three methods are only ap-
plicable if the neural network uses a convolutional layer as the
final layer. While this setting is common in image recognition, it is
rarely used in security applications and thus we do not study these
methods in our evaluation. Moreover, these methods do not handle
recurrent neural networks.
RTIS and MASK. These methods compute relevance scores by
solving an optimization problem for amaskm. A maskm is applied
to x asm ◦ x in order to affect x , for example by setting features to
zero. To this end, Fong and Vedaldi [16] propose the optimization
problem
m∗ = argmin
m∈[0,1]d
λ∥1 −m∥1 + fN (m ◦ x),
which determines a sparse mask, that identifies relevant features
of x . This can be solved using gradient descent, which thus makes
these white-box approaches. However, solving the equation above
often leads to noisy results which is why RTIS and MASK add
additional terms to achieve smooth solutions using regularization
and blurring. These concepts, however, are only applicable for
images and cannot be transferred to other types of features. As
a consequence, we do not consider these white-box methods in
the evaluation.
LIME and KernelSHAP. Ribeiro et al. [35] has proposed one of
the first black-box methods for explaining neural networks and
Lundberg and Lee [30] further extend this approach. Both methods
aim at approximating the decision function fN by creating a series
of l perturbations of x , denoted as x˜1, . . . , x˜l by setting entries in
the vector x to 0 randomly. The methods then proceed by predicting
a label fN (x˜i ) = y˜i for each x˜i of the l perturbations. This sampling
strategy enables the methods to approximate the local neighbor-
hood of fN at the point fN (x). LIME approximates the decision
boundary by a weighted linear regression model,
argmin
д∈G
l∑
i=1
πx (x˜i )
(
fN (x˜i ) − д(x˜i )
)2
,
where G is the set of all linear functions and πx is a function in-
dicating the difference between the input x and a perturbation x˜ .
KernelSHAP follows the same approach but additionally applies
concepts of game theory for the selection of relevant features. As
both approaches can be applied to all considered network architec-
tures, we study them in our empirical evaluation.
LEMNA. This black-box method, proposed by Guo et al. [20],
has been specifically designed for security applications. It uses
a mixture regression model for approximation, that is, a weighted
sum of linear models used for perturbations that takes the form
f (x) =
K∑
j=1
πj (βj · x + ϵj ).
The parameter K specifies the number of models, the random
variables ϵ = (ϵ1, . . . , ϵK ) originate from a normal distribution
ϵi ∼ N (0,σ ) and π = (π1, . . . ,πK ) holds the weights for each
model. Variables β1, . . . , βK are the regression coefficients and can
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be interpreted as k linear approximations of the decision boundary
near fN (x).
A Toy Example. As an illustrative example for the differences
between black-box and white-box methods, Figure 3 shows explana-
tions for a simple feed-forward network trained on the well-known
MNIST dataset. We compare explanations of LEMNA with LRP
where we use K = 1 and S = 104 for LEMNA and the ϵ-rule with
ϵ = 10−3 for LRP. Moreover, we randomly flip blocks of size 2 × 2
to create perturbations for LEMNA.
LE
M
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A
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Figure 3: Illustration of explanations for LEMNA (second row) and
LRP (third row). Red indicates relevances towards the decision of
the neural network, blue indicates relevances against the decision,
and green indicates no relevance.
Even in this toy example the explanations show notable differ-
ences. The leftmost column is classified as 7 and LEMNA explains
this decision with the top bar of the seven. This makes sense, as it
is likely that perturbations of the picture which do not have this
horizontal bar are classified as 1. LRP, however, also puts relevance
on the free space underneath the top bar and thereby indicates that
this free space is important so that the image is not classified as
the digit 9. By design, LEMNA is unable to mark this area, as its
perturbations are generated by setting features from 1 to 0, which
is insufficient to transform a 7 to a 9. Similar observations hold true
for the second and third columns.
The rightmost picture depicts a limitation of black-box methods.
The image is classified as 1, but when perturbing the pixels by
setting them to 0, the label does not change. As a consequence,
LEMNA cannot find a correlation between 1 and other digits and
produces a random explanation. LRP, in this case, highlights the
free areas left and right to the digit 1 as having the greatest impact.
4 SYSTEMS UNDER TEST
For our empirical evaluation, we consider four security systems that
have been recently proposed and employ deep learning techniques.
The systems cover the three major architectures introduced in
Section 2.1 and comprise between 4 to 6 layers of different types.
An overview of the systems is provided in Table 2.
System 1 — Drebin+. The first system that we call Drebin+ uses
a multilayer perceptron for identifying Android malware. The sys-
tem has been proposed by Grosse et al. [19] and builds on features
originally developed by Arp et al. [3]. The network consists of two
Table 2: Overview of the consideredd security systems.
System NN Implementation Arch. # Layers
Drebin+ ESORICS’17 [19] MLP 4
Mimicus+ CCS’18 [20] MLP 4
DAMD CODASPY’17 [32] CNN 6
VulDeePecker NDSS’18 [29] RNN 5
hidden layers, each comprising 200 neurons. The input features
are statically extracted from Android applications and cover data
from the application’s manifest, such as hardware details, requested
permissions, and filtered intents, as well as information based on
the application’s code, such as the used permissions, suspicious
API calls, and network addresses.
To verify the correctness of our implementation, we train the
system on the original Drebin dataset [3], where we use 75 % of the
129,013Android application for training and 25 % for testing. Table 3
shows the results of this experiment which match the performance
numbers published by Grosse et al. [19].
System 2 — Mimicus+ The second system that we denote as
Mimicus+ also uses a multilayer perceptron and is capable of de-
tecting malicious PDF documents. The systems is re-implemented
based on the work of Guo et al. [20] and builds on features origi-
nally introduced by Smutz and Stavrou [42]. Our implementation
uses two hidden layers with 200 nodes each and is trained with
135 features extracted from PDF documents. These features cover
properties about the document structure, such as the number of sec-
tions and fonts in the document, and are mapped to binary values
as described by Guo et al. [20]. For a full list of features we refer
the reader to the implementation by Šrndić and Laskov [46].
For verifying our implementation, we make use of the original
dataset that contains 5,000 benign and 5,000malicious PDF files and
again split the dataset into 75 % for training and 25 % for testing. Our
results are shown in Table 3 and come close to a perfect detection.
System 3 — DAMD The third security system studied in our
evaluation is called DAMD and uses a CNN for identifyingmalicious
Android applications [32]. The system processes the raw Dalvik
bytecode of Android applications and its network is comprised
of six layers for embedding, convolution and max-pooling of the
extracted instructions. As the system processes entire applications,
the number of features depends on the size and structure of the
applications. For a detailed description of this process, we refer the
reader to the original publication by McLaughlin et al. [32].
As a reference, we apply the system to data from the Malware
Genome Project [50]. This dataset consists of 2,123 applications in
total, with 863 benign and 1,260 malicious samples. Strictly speak-
ing, this is a subset of the Drebin dataset [3]. However, in order to
replicate the results of McLaughlin et al. [32], we choose to use the
same data. We again split the dataset into 75 % of training and 25 %
of testing data and obtain results similar to those presented in the
original publication, as shown in Table 3.
System 4 — VulDeePecker The fourth system is denoted as
VulDeePecker and uses a recurrent neural network (RNN) for dis-
covering vulnerabilities in source code [29]. The network comprises
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five layers, uses 300 LSTM cells [21], and applies a word2vec em-
bedding [33] with 200 dimensions for analyzing C/C++ code. As a
preprocessing step, the source code is sliced into code gadgets that
comprise short snippets of lexical tokens. The gadgets are truncated
or padded to a length of 50 tokens. To avoid overfitting, identifiers
and symbols are substituted with generic placeholders.
For verifying the correctness of our implementation, we use
the CWE-119 dataset, which consists of 39,757 code gadgets, with
10,444 gadgets corresponding to vulnerabilities. In line with the
original study, we split the dataset into 80 % training and 20 % testing
data. In our experiments, we yield an accuracy of 0.908 similar to
the original publication.
Table 3: Performance of our re-implementations of the security sys-
tems on the original datasets.
System Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
Drebin+ 0.980 0.926 0.924 0.925
Mimicus+ 0.994 0.991 0.998 0.994
DAMD 0.949 0.967 0.924 0.953
VulDeePecker 0.908 0.837 0.802 0.819
The four selected security systems provide a broad view on the
current use of deep learning in security. Drebin+ and Mimicus+ are
examples of systems that make use of MLPs for detecting malware.
They differ, however, in the dimensionality of the input, where
Mimicus+ works on a small set of engineered features and Drebin+
analyzes inputs with thousands of dimensions. DAMD is an exam-
ple of a system using a CNN in security and capable of learning
from inputs of variable length, whereas VulDeePecker makes use
of an RNN, similar to other learning-based approaches analyzing
program code [e.g., 10, 39, 47].
5 QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
To carve out the differences of black-box and white-box methods,
we start with a quantitative evaluation of the six methods. As the
practical efficacy of an explanation depends on different factors,
we introduce the following four performance measures for our
evaluation:
(1) Conciseness. An explanation is concise if the top-ranked fea-
tures play a crucial role in the prediction of the neural network.
We thus measure conciseness by successively removing rele-
vant features from a sample and monitoring the impact on the
prediction (Section 5.1).
(2) Sparsity. An explanation needs to be sparse for a human to be
understandable. Neural networks can operate on vectors with
thousands of dimensions and thus we investigate how well an
explanation method can condense its result without loosing
effectivity (Section 5.2).
(3) Completeness. An explanation method must be able to create
results for all data that is potentially interesting to a user. We
measure this property by examining cases in which the meth-
ods may not generate results and compute a ratio of incomplete
explanations (Section 5.3).
(4) Efficiency. Finally, an explanation needs to be computed in a
reasonable amount of time. While low run-time is not a strict
requirement in practice, time differences between minutes and
milliseconds are still important and thus considered in our
evaluation (Section 5.4).
For our evaluation, we implement LEMNA in accordance to
Guo et al. [20] and use the Python package cvxpy [12] to solve
the linear regression problem with fused lasso restriction. We set
the number of mixture models to K = 3 and the number of per-
turbations to l = 500. The parameter S is set to 104 for Drebin+
and Mimicus+, as the underlying features are not sequential, and
to 10−3 for the sequences of DAMD and VulDeePecker, accord-
ing to Guo et al. [20]. We implement LIME with l = 500 pertur-
bations, cosine similarity for proximity measure and use the re-
gression solver from the scipy package with L1 regularization.
For KernelSHAP we make use of the open source implementation
from Lundberg and Lee [30]1.
To generate the explanations for LRP, Gradient and IG we make
use of the iNNvestigate toolbox by Alber et al. [1], except for the
VulDeePecker model for which we apply the RNN implementation
from Arras et al. [4] for LRP. For all experiments we set ϵ = 10−3
and use N = 64 steps for IG, except for VulDeePecker where we
use N = 256.
5.1 Conciseness of Explanations
We start by investigating the conciseness of the explanations gen-
erated for the four considered security systems. To this end, we
stick to the approach by Guo et al. [20] for measuring the impact of
removing features on the classification result. In particular, we com-
pute the average remaining accuracy (ARA). For some k = 1, . . . , F
the ARA is calculated by removing the k most relevant features
from a sample and running it through the neural network again.
This procedure is performed on all samples and the average softmax
probability of the original class of the samples is reported.
How is the ARA expected to behave? If we successively remove
relevant features, the ARA will decrease, as the neural network
has less information for making a correct prediction. The better
the explanation, the quicker the ARA will drop as more relevant
information has been removed. In the long term, ARA converges
to the probability score of the sample with no information, i.e.
containing only zeros.
Technically, we implement ARA by removing the specific fea-
tures of the four systems under test as follows. For Drebin+ and
Mimicus+, features are removed by setting the features to 0. For
DAMDwe replace the top instructions with the no-op byte code and
for VulDeePecker we simply replace the top lexical tokens from the
code with an embedding of only zeros. Moreover, we introduce a
Brute-Force method as a baseline for this experiment. This method
calculates the relevance ri by setting xi to zero and measuring the
difference in the softmax probability, i.e. ri = fN (x) − fN (x |xi = 0).
We call this method Brute-Force because a sample with d features
has to be classified d times again, which can be time consuming for
data with lots of features.
EvaluationResults: ARA Figure 4 (top row) presents the results
of our evaluation for the four considered security systems. For
1https://github.com/slundberg/shap
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the ARA curves shown in the upper row, we observe that white-
box methods (green) consistently perform better than black-box
methods (red) on all systems. VulDeePecker is the only dataset
where LIME can obtain results similar to IG and LRP. Notably, for
the DAMDdataset, IG and LRP are the onlymethods to generate real
impact on the average accuracy. For Mimicus+, white-box methods
achieve a perfect ARA of 0 after only 25 features.
In addition to Figure 4, Table 4a shows the area under curve (AUC)
for the ARA curves. A lower AUC indicates better explanations and
we observe that white-box methods are 30 % better than black-box
methods on average over all systems and methods. Also, white-box
methods always achieve results close to or even better than the
Brute-Force approach.
5.2 Sparsity of Explanations
We continue to compare the two explanation methods and inves-
tigate the sparsity of the generated explanations. To this end, we
normalize the explanations of all methods by dividing the relevance
vectors by the maximum of their absolute values so that the values
for every sample are between −1 and 1. While this normalization
helps a human analyst to identify top-ranked features, the sheer
amount of data in an explanation can still render an interpreta-
tion intractable. As a consequence, we expect a useful explanation
method to assign high relevance scores to only a few features and
keep the majority at a relevance of 0. To measure the sparsity we
create a normalized histogram h of the relevance values to access
the distribution of the values and calculate the mass around zero
(MAZ) metric defined byMAZ (r ) =
∫ r
−r h(x)dx for r ∈ [0, 1]. Sparse
explanations that assign many features with relevances close to 0
will have a steep rise in MAZ at r close to zero and a flat slope when
r is close to 1 since only few features are assigned high relevance.
Evaluation results. The second row in Figure 4 shows the the
development of MAZ for the datasets and methods. We observe
that white-box methods assign significantly more features a value
close to zero, indicating that they are not relevant. This stands in
contrast to black-box methods which assign relevance values to
features with a broader range around zero resulting in flatter slopes
of the MAZ close to 0.
LEMNA’s relevance distribution for VulDeePecker is showing a
steep rise close to 1 indicating that it assigns a lot of tokens a high
relevance which is undesirable but results from the fused lasso con-
straint in the concept of LEMNA. For the DAMD network, we can
see that IG has a massive peak at 0 showing that it marks almost all
features as meaningless while, according to the experiments on the
ARA, still choosing effective ones. This is particularly advantageous
for human experts since the DAMD dataset contains up to 520,000
features per sample and investigating thousands of relevant bytes
is tedious work.
We summarize the performance on the MAZ metric by calcu-
lating the area under curve again in table Table 4b. A higher AUC
indicates that more features were assigned a relevance close to 0
and few features were assigned a relevance close to ±1. On average
over all datasets and methods, we find that white-box methods
are 19 % sparser compared to black-box methods.
Table 4: Conciseness and sparsity of explanations for different
methods. Area under ARA curve when (a) removing up to 40 most
important features and (b) calculating MAZ for histograms of the
relevances.
(a) Area under curve for ARA curves from Figure 4.
Method Drebin+ Mimicus+ DAMD VulDeePecker
LIME 0.5796 0.2569 0.9187 0.5714
LEMNA 0.6560 0.4050 0.9827 0.7635
KernelSHAP 0.8909 0.5650 0.9661 0.8689
Gradient 0.4720 0.2126 0.8575 0.8557
IG 0.4461 0.2059 0.4985 0.5737
LRP 0.4743 0.2127 0.5035 0.6250
Brute-Force 0.4742 0.2079 0.5178 0.5682
(b) Area under curve for MAZ curves from Figure 4.
Method Drebin+ Mimicus+ DAMD VulDeePecker
LIME 0.7569 0.7523 0.8326 0.7445
LEMNA 0.6806 0.7271 0.6246 0.4160
KernelSHAP 0.7832 0.7164 0.7133 0.8132
Gradient 0.8459 0.8562 0.9487 0.8159
IG 0.8473 0.8575 0.9983 0.8390
LRP 0.8459 0.8561 0.9641 0.8271
Brute-Force 0.8487 0.8573 0.9979 0.8460
5.3 Completeness of Explanations
We additionally examine the completeness of explanations. The
white-box methods we analyze can provide explanations for all
samples that are processed by a neural network since they perform
deterministic computation steps to calculate relevances, thus we do
not analyze white-box methods in this section. For LIME, LEMNA
and KernelSHAP the situation is different: In order to generate
an explanation, it is necessary to create perturbations from the
actual sample by setting features to zero at random and classify
these perturbations with the neural network. In this setting, it is
important that the perturbations have labels from the opposite
class as otherwise none of these methods have a possibility to find
relevant features for the classification.
During our experiments with 500 perturbations we find that
the analyzed black-box methods produce meaningful results if at
least 20 of the perturbations (about 4 % on average) come from the
opposite class. We thus analyze how often we find this amount of
perturbations for the four considered security systems.
Evaluation Results. Table 5 provides results on the problem of
incompleteness. On average 29 % of the samples cannot be explained
well, as the computed perturbations contain too few instances from
the opposite class. In particular, we observe that creating malicious
perturbations from benign samples is a severe problem for Drebin+
and DAMD, where only 32.6 % and 2.8 %, respectively, of the benign
samples achieve sufficient malicious perturbations.
This problem arises from the fact that only few features make
a sample malicious, whereas there exists a large variety of benign
features. As a consequence, setting malicious features to 0 for a
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Figure 4: Conciseness of explanations for black-box and white-box methods. Top row: ARA when removing relevant features; bottom row:
MAZ for histograms of relevance values.
Table 5: Incomplete explanations of black-box methods. First two
columns: samples remaining when enforcing at least 4% perturba-
tions of opposite class, last column: incomplete explanations.
System Class + Class – Incomplete
Drebin+ 32.6 % 99.1 % 58.6 %
Mimicus+ 87.8 % 99.5 % 6.1 %
DAMD 2.8 % 97.2 % 44.7 %
VulDeePecker 95.0 % 95.8 % 7.5 %
Average 54.6% 97.9% 29.2%
perturbation usually leads to a benign classification. Setting benign
features to zero, however, often does not impact the classification re-
sult. For example, the smallest byte-sequence in the DAMD dataset
is eight bytes long and classified as benign. Nomatter which feature-
combinations are set to zero for the perturbations, the sample will
never be classified as malicious by the network.
Table 6: Run-time per explanation of the different explanation
methods.
Method Drebin+ Mimicus+ DAMD VulDeePecker
LIME 30.54ms 28.32ms 736.21ms 30.04ms
LEMNA 4.59 s 2.56 s 685.90 s 6.14 s
KernelSHAP 9.05 s 424.80ms 44.55 s 4.95 s
Gradient 4.43ms 0.07ms 26.77ms 1.21ms
IG 134.00ms 0.79ms 26.70ms 1.01ms
LRP 4.34ms 0.08ms 15.29ms 254.55ms
Brute-Force 621.12ms 202.84ms 517.18 s 210.97ms
5.4 Efficiency of Explanations
When dealing with large amounts of data, it might be desirable for
the user to create explanations for every sample to identify features
that are important for an entire class. We therefore compare the
run-time of white-box and black-box methods by processing all
datasets and measuring the average run-time per sample. Since
black-box methods are non-deterministic and the run-time depends
on the initialization of the parameters, we repeat the black-box
algorithms 10 times for every sample and use the median value of
the 10 runs for the calculation of the mean run-time.
EvaluationResults. Table 6 shows the average run-time for gen-
erating explanations for the considered systems. We observe that
white-box methods are at least an order of magnitude faster than
black-box methods on all datasets. This advantage arises from the
fact that data can be processed batch-wise for white-box methods,
that is, explanations for a set of samples can be calculated at the
same time. The Mimicus+ dataset, for example, can be processed
in one batch resulting in a speed-up factor of more than 400 over
the fastest black-box method LIME. The runtime of the black-box
methods increases for high dimensional datasets, especially DAMD,
since the regression problems for them have to be solved in higher
dimensions. While the speed-up factors are already enormous, we
have not even included the creation of perturbations and their clas-
sification for the black-box algorithms, which require additional
run-time as well.
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Table 7: Mean results of the explanation methods wrt. the four different metrics. The last column summarizes these metrics in a rating
comprising three levels: strong ( ), medium ( ), and weak (#).
Explanation Method Conciseness Sparsity Completeness Efficiency Overall Rating
LIME 0.5817 0.7716 – 2.06 × 10−1 s   #  
LEMNA 0.7018 0.6121 – 1.75 × 102 s # # # #
KernelSHAP 0.8227 0.7565 – 1.47 × 101 s #  # #
Gradient 0.5999 0.8667 ✓ 1.26 × 10−2 s     
IG 0.4311 0.8855 ✓ 4.06 × 10−2 s     
LRP 0.4539 0.8733 ✓ 6.92 × 10−2 s     
Brute-Force 0.4420 0.8875 ✓ 1.30 × 102 s    #
5.5 Summary
We evaluated the four metrics conciseness, sparsity, completeness
and efficiency in the last four subsections. However, a good expla-
nation method should achieve good results in each metric and on
every dataset. For example, we have seen that the Gradient method
computes sparse results in a decent amount of time but the features
are not concise on the DAMD and VulDeePecker dataset. Equally,
the relevances of KernelSHAP for the Drebin+ dataset are sparser
than those from LEMNA but less concise at the same time. We sum-
marize the results of all explanations methods on the four data-sets
by computing the mean of the four metrics to enable a comparison
of all methods.
Evaluation Results. Table 7 Shows the average performance
of the methods for the four metrics. For each metric we assign
each method one of the categories  ,  , and #. The  category
is assigned to the best method and all other metrics that lie in a
decent area around the best method. The # category is assigned to
the worst method and methods close to it. Finally, the category is
assigned to methods that lie between the best and worst methods.
We see that only white-box methods achieve a  ranking in all
metrics. They can compute results in less than 70ms, mark only
few features as relevant and those features have great impact on
the decision of the classifier.
6 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
Finally, we turn to a qualitative analysis of white-box and black-box
explanations. To this end, we visualize and discuss explanations for
the four security systems in detail. As a result of Section 5 we focus
on the results from IG and LIME since these are the best white-box
and black-box methods respectively.
To visualize the relevance vector of an explanation, we normalize
the scores to −1 and 1, and highlight features according to whether
they support the decision (green color) or contradict the decision
(red color). The brightness reflects the importance of the features.
6.1 Drebin+
We start the qualitative analysis with an Android application from
the Drebin dataset, which the neural network correctly classifies
as malware. The considered sample2 belongs to the FakeInstaller
family [31], whose members are known to steal money from smart-
phone users by secretly sending text messages (SMS) to premium
services. In order to trick users into installing this kind of malware,
2MD5: 7c5d7667c0734b2faf9abd68a882b146
the malicious code is often repackaged into legitimate applications.
Table 8 depicts the explanations from IG and LIME side by side.
Explanations. The consideredmalware sample exhibits low com-
plexity, allowing us to present all extracted features along with their
relevance scores in Table 8. Both methods rate features as highly rel-
evant (highlighted in green), that can be linked to the SMS function-
ality of the device. For instance, the requested permission SEND_SMS
is pointed out by both methods. Moreover, features related to ac-
cessing sensitive information, such as the READ_PHONE_STATE per-
mission and the API call getSimCountryIso have also obtained
high scores. In line with the malware’s objective, the accentuation
of these features seems valid.
Nonetheless, the explanations also bring features to light that
contradict the neural network’s classification as malware (high-
lighted in red). Both methods assign high relevance scores to the
hardware feature touchscreen, the launcher intent filter, and the
(used) INTERNET permission. However, these features generally oc-
cur in most Android applications and are thus not particularly
descriptive for benignity. Naturally, the interpretation of features
speaking for benign application is more challenging due to the
broader scope and the difficulty in defining benignity. In the worst
case, however, the missing context of the selected features may
indicate that the underlying classifier considers artifacts of the data
at hand rather than learning the underlying task.
Summary. Overall, we find that IG and LIME both provide sim-
ilar results when explaining the decisions of the neural network
employed by Drebin+. We therefore conclude that both methods
are on par with each other in this setting. While they often point
to features that are helpful to identify characteristics of malicious
applications, features speaking for benignity are less specific and
even suggest that artifacts might have been learned.
6.2 Mimicus+
Next, we discuss the results of both explanation methods for a ma-
licious PDF document3 from the Mimicus+ dataset. The document
tries to exploit vulnerabilities in the JavaScript engine to download
and install additional malicious code to the system [15].
Explanations. Inspecting the explanations of IG and LIME for
Mimicus+, we observe that the features for classification of malware
are dominated by the features count_javascript and count_js
which both stand for the number of JavaScript object markers in
3MD5: 33539f91407615622618b83c453f9541
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Table 8: Explanations for the Android malware FakeInstaller generated for Drebin+ using IG and LIME.
Id IG LIME
0 permission::android.permission.SEND_SMS permission::android.permission.SEND_SMS
1 activity::.FirstActivity call::sendSMS
2 call::sendSMS activity::.FirstActivity
3 permission::android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE feature::android.hardware.telephony
4 feature::android.hardware.telephony intent::android.intent.action.DATA_SMS_RECEIVED
5 intent::android.intent.action.DATA_SMS_RECEIVED permission::android.permission.INTERNET
6 service_receiver::.services.SMSSenderService permission::android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
7 service_receiver::.sms.BinarySMSReceiver service_receiver::.services.SMSSenderService
8 permission::android.permission.INTERNET call::getSimCountryIso
9 call::getSimCountryIso api_call::android/../TelephonyManager;->getLine1Number
10 api_call::android/../TelephonyManager;->getLine1Number api_call::android/app/Activity;->startActivity
11 api_call::android/app/Activity;->startActivity service_receiver::.sms.BinarySMSReceiver
12 permission::android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS real_permission::android.permission.SEND_SMS
13 real_permission::android.permission.SEND_SMS api_call::org/apache/http/impl/client/DefaultHttpClient
14 intent::android.intent.action.MAIN permission::android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
15 call::printStackTrace call::printStackTrace
16 api_call::org/apache/http/impl/client/DefaultHttpClient api_call::android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage
17 api_call::android/telephony/SmsManager;->sendTextMessage real_permission::android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
18 real_permission::android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE intent::android.intent.action.MAIN
19 call::getSystemService call::getSystemService
20 real_permission::android.permission.INTERNET real_permission::android.permission.INTERNET
21 intent::android.intent.category.LAUNCHER intent::android.intent.category.LAUNCHER
22 feature::android.hardware.touchscreen feature::android.hardware.touchscreen
the document. Table 10 shows the explanations of both methods
for the selected malicious document. For better representation, we
only show the 10most important features for both classes and refer
the reader to Table 12 in the appendix for a full listing.
The coloring of the features confirms observations from the
sparsity analysis in Figure 4, that is, IG chooses more features close
to zero and only marks a few features with strong relevance. In
contrast, LIME distributes the relevance across more features and
provides a less concise explanation. The strong impact of JavaScript
object markers identified by both method is meaningful, as it is
well known that JavaScript is used in malicious PDF documents
frequently [26].
We also identify relevant features in the explanations that are
non-intuitive, especially since Guo et al. [20] train the model by set-
ting non-zero features to one to make the representation usable for
LEMNA. For example, features like count_trailer that measures
the number of trailermarkers in the document or count_box_letter
that counts the number of US letter sized boxes can be hardly re-
lated to security and rather constitute an artifact of the binary
conversion.
To investigate which features aremost often indicative for benign
and malicious samples, we count how often feature appear in the
top 10 features of all samples in the dataset and report the 5 most
prominent candidates for both classes in Table 9. Furthermore, we
specify in which fraction of the samples from the two classes these
samples occur in the entire dataset to see whether these features
are well chosen by the explanation methods.
For the benign class we find that the features count_font (count
of font object markers), producer_mismatch (count of differences
in producer values) and title_num (count of numeric characters
in title) occur in the top features of both methods and those fea-
tures are appearing rarely in the malicious samples. LIME finds
the pos_eof_min (normalized position of last EOF marker) which
is frequent in both classes. IG uses the title_uc (count of upper
case letters in title) features often which is assigned significantly
more often in the benign samples. Given these observations it might
be easy for malware authors to evade a detection of Mimicus+ by
using font object markers in the document and numeric, upper case
letters in the author name and document title or avoid the usage of
JavaScript.
Summary. LIME and IG both use the count of JavaScript object
markers as the most important features for classification. JavaScript
Table 9: Most prominent features from the Mimicus+ dataset from
the explanationmethods for every class and fraction of appearance
of the feature in the benign andmalicious class in the entire dataset.
Class Top 5 Feature Method Benign Malicious
– count_font Both 98.4 % 20.8 %
– producer_mismatch Both 97.5 % 16.6 %
– title_num Both 68.6 % 4.8 %
– pdfid1_num Both 81.5 % 2.8 %
– title_uc IG 68.6 % 4.8 %
– pos_eof_min LIME 100.0 % 93.4 %
+ count_javascript Both 6.0 % 88.0 %
+ count_js Both 5.2 % 83.4 %
+ count_trailer Both 89.3 % 97.7 %
+ pos_page_avg IG 100.0 % 100.0 %
+ count_endobj IG 100.0 % 99.6 %
+ createdate_tz LIME 85.5 % 99.9 %
+ count_action LIME 16.4 % 73.8 %
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appears in 88.0 % of the malicious documents where only about 6 %
of the benign samples use it. This makes JavaScript an extremely
discriminating feature for the dataset. From a security perspective,
however, this is a less satisfying result, as the neural network of
Mimicus+ relies on a single indicator for detecting the malicious
code in the selected document.
Table 10: Explanations for a malicious PDF document generated for
Mimicus+ using IG and LIME.
Id IG LIME
0 count_javascript count_js
1 count_js count_javascript
2 count_trailer count_page
3 count_endobj ratio_size_stream
4 box_other_only createdate_version_ratio
5 pos_page_avg size
6 createdate_tz createdate_tz
7 count_stream pos_acroform_avg
8 pos_page_min pos_box_min
9 ratio_size_stream pos_page_min
10 ... ...
34 moddate_tz pos_page_avg
35 size pos_image_avg
36 pos_eof_max pos_eof_avg
37 count_endstream pos_image_min
38 pos_eof_avg ratio_size_page
39 moddate_version_ratio count_eof
40 count_xref len_stream_max
41 count_eof moddate_tz
42 pos_eof_min count_xref
43 len_stream_max pos_eof_min
6.3 DAMD
We resume with the interpretation of explanations for the An-
droid malware detector DAMD. To this end, we analyze 9 mali-
cious applications from three popular Android malware families:
GoldDream [25], DroidKungFu [24], and DroidDream [17]. These
families exfiltrate sensitive user data and can install exploits on the
device to take over full control.
Explanations. In our analysis of the raw Dalvik bytecode that
the neural network processes, the black-box method’s tendency of
considering large numbers of long sequences becomes apparent.
This confirms results from experiments in Section 5. White-box
methods, on the contrary, highlight only very few sequences. Con-
sequently, analyzing all “relevant” features of LIME’s explanation,
unfortunately, is infeasible in practice, while it seems perfectly
doable for IG. To further examine whether this reduced selection
indeed points to essential characteristics of the malicious samples,
we analyze the opcodes with the highest IG scores and find that
these indeed are directly linked to the malicious functionality of
these applications.
As an example, Table 11 depicts the opcode sequence, that is
found in all samples of the GoldDream family4. Taking a closer
look, the opcode sequence can be identified to only occur in the
4e.g., MD5: a4184a7fcaca52696f3d1c6cf8ce3785
onReceive method of the com.GoldDream.zj.zjReceiver class. In
this function, the malware intercepts incoming SMS and phone
calls and stores the information in local files before sending them
to an external server.
Similar results are achieved by IG for the other malware fam-
ilies: members of the DroidDream family are known to root in-
fected device by running different exploits. If the attack has been
successful, the malware installs itself as a service with the name
com.android.root.Setting [17]. The top-ranked features deter-
mined by IG indeed lead to two methods of this very service,
namely com.android.root.Setting.getRawResource() together
with com.android.root.Setting.cpFile(). Likewise, the highest
ranked opcode sequence of the DroidKungFu family point to the
class, in which the decryption routine for the root exploit is stored
in. Note that for all members of each family, the identified opcode
sequences are identical, thus proving that (a) DAMD has learned
a crucial characteristic of these families, and (b) IG to the points
explains what the neural network has learned.
Table 11: Explanations of IG and LIME for a sample of the Gold-
Dream family from the DAMDdataset. The selected opcodes belong
to the onReceive method of the malware.
Id IG LIME
0 invoke-virtual invoke-virtual
1 move-result-object move-result-object
2 if-eqz if-eqz
3 const-string const-string
4 invoke-virtual invoke-virtual
5 move-result-object move-result-object
6 check-cast check-cast
7 array-length array-length
8 new-array new-array
9 const/4 const/4
10 array-length array-length
11 if-ge if-ge
12 aget-object aget-object
13 check-cast check-cast
Summary. In all analyzed samples, IG points to only a few but
highly relevant features, thus enabling us to understand the de-
cisions made by the classifier. In contrast, LIME marks a larger
number of long opcode sequences as relevant, making it difficult to
find the relevant places in the opcode sequence.
6.4 VulDeePecker
Finally, we turn to the field of vulnerability discovery where we look
at explanations for neural network learned by VulDeePecker [29].
In contrast to the previous case studies, the neural network clas-
sifies samples in the form of program slices, that is, a sequence
of lexical tokens of program code in the order of its execution.
Figure 5(a) shows the source code of such a program slice, while
Figures 5(b) and 5(c) depict the same piece of code as lexical tokens,
including the relevance of each token for IG and LIME, respectively.
Note that VulDeePecker by design restricts its inputs to the last
50 tokens in the program slice.
The sample illustrates a buffer overflow originating from the
definition of the fixed size buffers on line 2 and 4. Later on, in line 7,
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1 data = NULL;
2 data = new wchar_t[50];
3 data[0] = L'\\0';
4 wchar_t source[100];
5 wmemset(source, L'C', 100-1);
6 source[100-1] = L'\\0';
7 memmove(data, source, 100*sizeof(wchar_t));
(a) Original code
1 INT0 ] ;
2 VAR0 [ INT0 ] = STR0 ;
3 wchar_t VAR0 [ INT0 ] ;
4 wmemset ( VAR0 , STR0 , INT0 - INT1 ) ;
5 VAR0 [ INT0 - INT1 ] = STR0 ;
6 memmove ( VAR0 , VAR1 , INT0 * sizeof ( wchar_t ) ) ;
(b) Integrated Gradients
1 INT0 ] ;
2 VAR0 [ INT0 ] = STR0 ;
3 wchar_t VAR0 [ INT0 ] ;
4 wmemset ( VAR0 , STR0 , INT0 - INT1 ) ;
5 VAR0 [ INT0 - INT1 ] = STR0 ;
6 memmove ( VAR0 , VAR1 , INT0 * sizeof ( wchar_t ) ) ;
(c) LIME
Figure 5: Explanations for a code sample from the VulDeeP-
ecker dataset using (a) LEMNA and (b) LRP.
data from the one buffer, source, is copied to the other, data, using
the memmove function. The third argument of the function deter-
mines the number of bytes that are copied, which is set to the size of
100 wide characters of type wchar_t. Consequently, twice as many
bytes are moved to the destination buffer than it may contain.
Explanations. In contrast to the approaches described before,
the features (the lexical tokens) here are strongly interconnected
on a syntactical level. This becomes apparent in the explanations
of IG where adjacent tokens have mostly equal colors and red and
green tokens are often separated by tokens with no color. LIME
does have red and green tokens directly beneath each other since
it sees the tokens independently in its regression problem.
Although it has been shown in Section 5 that both methods
are concise on this dataset we find that the explanations for this
sample are very different. While IG highlights the wmemset call as
important, LIME assigns this call as relevant towards the class of
not vulnerable and highlights the final memmove call as important.
While it is possible to work out certain differences in the ex-
planation of both methods, as an human expert it still is difficult
to relate: First, an analyst interprets the source code rather than
the extracted tokens and thus maintains a different view on the
data. The interpretation of the highlighted INT0 and INT1 tokens as
buffer sizes of 50 and 100 wide characters is misleading, since the
method itself is not aware of this relation. Second, VulDeePecker
truncates essential parts of the code. From the initialization of the
destination buffer, for instance, only (the token of) the size remains
as part of the input. For larger code samples this limitation is even
more severe. Third, the large amount of highlighted tokens like
semicolon, brackets and equal signs is indicating that VulDeePecker
did not learn what vulnerabilities really are but rather overfitted
the given dataset.
Summary. IG and LIME provide different explanations of the
prediction by VulDeePecker. The essential features are difficult
to understand and likely pinpoint artifacts that are only loosely
related to the underlying vulnerabilities. This insight strikingly
underlines the need for applying explanation methods to neural
networks, as such artifacts may provide a wrong impression of a
system’s performance in practice.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The widespread application of deep learning in security renders
means for explaining and understanding their decisions vitally
important. Depending on the application setting, these explanations
need to be determined in either a black-box or white-box manner.
We show that if access to the employed neural network is available,
white-box explanations provide significant advantages over black-
box methods by generating more concise, complete and efficient
explanations. The explained features can often be traced back to
specific security contexts that help to assess the prediction of a
neural network and gain insights into its decision process.
Aside from these results, we also reveal notable problems in
the general application of deep learning in security. For all con-
sidered systems under test, we identify artifacts that substantially
contribute to predictions, but are entirely unrelated to the security
task. While several of these artifacts are rooted in peculiarities of
the underlying data, it is evident that the employed deep neural net-
works have the tendency to subsume the data rather than solving
the underlying task. We thus conclude that effective explanations
need to become an integral part of any deep learning system in
order to keep the learning focused on the problem at hand.
Note that we deliberately do not study adversarial examples
in this paper. Techniques for attacking and defending learning al-
gorithms are orthogonal to our work. These techniques can be
augmented using explanations, yet it is completely open how this
can be done in a secure manner. Recent defenses for adversarial
examples based on explanations have proven to be totally ineffec-
tive [6].
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APPENDIX
A EXAMPLE EXPLANATIONS
Due to space limitations in Section 6 we show a full sample from
the Mimicus+ sample in Table 12 which is classified as malicious
correctly by the neural network. The relevance values of both meth-
ods are sorted from high (green) speaking for the decision of the
classifier to negative (red) speaking against the decision. We ob-
serve that IG assigns a high relevance mostly to two top features
and gives less relevance to the remaining features. LIME assigns
relevance more broadly to the sample.
Table 12: Explanations for a malicious PDF document generated for
Mimicus+ using IG and LIME.
Id IG LIME
0 count_javascript count_js
1 count_js count_javascript
2 count_trailer count_page
3 count_endobj ratio_size_stream
4 box_other_only createdate_version_ratio
5 pos_page_avg size
6 createdate_tz createdate_tz
7 count_stream pos_acroform_avg
8 pos_page_min pos_box_min
9 ratio_size_stream pos_page_min
10 len_obj_min pos_box_max
11 count_page count_stream
12 pos_box_avg pos_page_max
13 pos_page_max version
14 pos_acroform_min pos_acroform_min
15 pos_acroform_avg len_stream_min
16 moddate_ts len_obj_avg
17 pos_image_max pos_image_max
18 pos_box_min createdate_ts
19 pos_image_avg count_obj
20 len_obj_max ratio_size_obj
21 createdate_ts count_trailer
22 pos_box_max pos_eof_max
23 ratio_size_page box_other_only
24 len_stream_min len_obj_max
25 pos_acroform_max pos_acroform_max
26 count_obj pos_box_avg
27 createdate_version_ratio len_obj_min
28 len_obj_avg count_endobj
29 count_startxref moddate_ts
30 ratio_size_obj len_stream_avg
31 pos_image_min moddate_version_ratio
32 len_stream_avg count_startxref
33 version count_endstream
34 moddate_tz pos_page_avg
35 size pos_image_avg
36 pos_eof_max pos_eof_avg
37 count_endstream pos_image_min
38 pos_eof_avg ratio_size_page
39 moddate_version_ratio count_eof
40 count_xref len_stream_max
41 count_eof moddate_tz
42 pos_eof_min count_xref
43 len_stream_max pos_eof_min
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